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Abstract: 
Using project data from a random sample of Phase II research awards from the National 
Institutes of Health SBIR program, we estimate the relative probability that woman-owned firms 
are able to attract private investments to fund the transition of the technology developed under 
the sponsorship of the SBIR program to an innovation to enter the market. We find that women-
owned firms are as much as 16% points less likely to attract private investment dollars compared 
to male-owned firms, factors excluding the size of the SBIR award held constant. Women-owned 
firms that received larger awards performed substantially better. Although the SBIR program has 
a legislated directive to increase the participation of woman-owned firms in the program, our 
findings suggest that it might not be sufficient to overcome market perceptions about the 
profitability of such investments actually bringing a developed technology to market. 
Keywords: innovation | entrepreneurship | SBIR program |  venture capital | gender 
discrimination | economics | small businesses | private investment 
Article: 
Half a league, half a league, 
Half a league onward … 
— Rudyard Kipling 
1 Introduction 
 
Most, if not all, technology-based entrepreneurial firms will enter the Valley of Death at some 
point during their growth.1 After a new technology is created, often through public-sector 
support, the firm will find itself in need of financial capital to transform its creative ideas or 
inventions to innovations and ultimately to a commercializable product. When such capital is not 
available, the invention dies; when such capital is available to leverage the transition from 
invention to innovation, the entrepreneurial firm is positioned to enter a market and grow if 
successful.2 This transitional funding generally comes from private investment sources, venture 
capital (VC) in particular. 
Due to an underinvestment in the transitional research, not all firms bridge the Valley of Death. 
This underinvestment is due in part to an asymmetry of information between entrepreneurs and 
private investors. Some (e.g., Tassey 2010) have therefore argued that government has a role to 
help such firms bridge the valley, because this asymmetry of information, and thus an inability of 
the private sector to accurately forecast expected returns, creates a barrier to the development of 
new technology. In fact, the Administration’s recent report on reviving the U.S. manufacturing 
sector sets forth such a role to overcome this element of market failure, namely “to provide 
support to advance specific early-stage technologies that have transformative potential, but for 
which rational private actors will under-invest….” (Executive Office of the President 2011, p. 
18). 
In this paper, we focus on gender and alternative private investments in technology-based 
entrepreneurial firms. As such, we draw on two bodies of literature to motivate the empirical 
focus of our analysis. The first body of literature relates to the role of gender in entrepreneurship 
and the second relates to gender and access to alternative private investments. 
There is a rich literature on the role of gender in entrepreneurship. For example, previous 
research has shown that women are less likely to start a new business or to be self-employed than 
men (Blanchflower and Meyer 1994; Reynolds 1997; Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Uusitalo 
2001; Link and Welsh 2001). Extending this literature, Fairlie and Marion (2010) show that 
affirmative action programs have led to an increase in women-owned firms in public 
procurement markets. Van der Zwan et al. (2011, p. 14) note that, while women “are a valuable 
and untapped source of entrepreneurial diversity [who] can function as a role model for other 
females to engage in entrepreneurship,” in some European countries females face barriers to 
starting new businesses. 
There is also a rich literature on the role of gender on access to alternative private investments, 
especially to VC funds. Most of what is known about alternative private investments relates to 
the VC industry, its structure (e.g., National Venture Capital Association 2011) and its economic 
underpinnings (e.g., Gompers and Lerner 2004). In addition to industry-specific information, 
some stylized generalizations have been offered about the availability of VC to women in 
particular. One conclusion from the Diana Project is Gatewood et al. (2009, p. 129)3: 
Women’s participation in the VC industry has not kept pace with industry growth, and women 
have exited the industry at a faster rate than men, thus creating a significant barrier for women 
entrepreneurs in that it is less likely that their networks will overlap with the financial supplier 
networks, despite any effort they may expend networking and seeking capital. 
Wright et al. (2006) and Colombo et al. (2011) have studied access to VC by technology-based 
firms, but these firms were not necessarily nascent entrepreneurial ventures. Nascent technology-
based firms, at least those in the United States, have relatively less access to VC funding than to 
other investment funds.4 
Surprisingly, however, especially in light of the current policy forum and in the aftermath of the 
excitement of the Diana project, there is a conspicuous absence of systematic empirical 
information about the allocation of alternative investment funds to women-owned technology-
based entrepreneurial firms, arguably the fastest growing group of entrepreneurial firms in the 
United States. 
This paper advances this literature on an empirical level in several important ways. First, our 
empirical analysis focuses on technology-based entrepreneurial activity within small firms. 
Second, that activity is quantified at the project level, rather than at the more aggregated firm 
level, which dominates the literature. And third, we focus on access to alternative private 
investments, which do include VC but VC is rarely available among such firms. 
We find that female entrepreneurs are substantially less likely to receive private investment 
funding, compared to similar male entrepreneurs. The difference is less pronounced when more 
information, prior government funding in particular, is available to potential investors. We also 
show that, conditional on receiving private investments, female firm owners are likely to obtain 
less funding. 
In Sect. 2, we posit a model of private investment to technology-based entrepreneurial firms, and 
we hypothesize correlates with the probability that a particular technology will attract such 
funding. We also describe our database of technology projects. It contains information on 
projects funded by the National Institutes of Health through a Phase II Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) award. In Sect. 3, we present and discuss our empirical findings. 
The paper concludes in Sect. 4 with summary remarks. 
2 Quantitative analysis 
 
2.1 Supply of private investment funds 
 
Gompers and Lerner (2004) argue that there are four factors that limit an entrepreneur’s access to 
VC, or that guide VC investments. These include, with reference to a technology-based 
entrepreneur: uncertainty, asymmetric information, the nature of the firm’s assets, and market 
conditions.5 These factors also likely apply to any private investment in an entrepreneurial 
venture. 
Briefly, uncertainty refers to the fact that there is an array of possible innovative outcomes from 
an entrepreneur’s technology, and this imposes an element of uncertainty on the investor’s 
calculus about the expected return on an investment. In other words, the less certain the investor 
about the specific innovation(s) that are likely to result from the entrepreneur’s technology, the 
less attractive is the investment opportunity. Information asymmetry makes it difficult for private 
investors to determine who the more efficient entrepreneur is. Objective signals that facilitate the 
investor’s ability to scrutinize independently the innovation potential of the entrepreneur’s 
technology make the investment opportunity more attractive. In the event that the research output 
of the entrepreneur falls short of its innovation potential, a private investor will prefer to have 
invested in a firm with collateral tangible assets compared to only intellectual assets. And finally, 
market conditions, meaning the expected size and competitive condition in the market for the 
innovation, will influence the investor’s investment decision. 
Thus, we posit a simple probability model of the supply of private investment to a technology-
based entrepreneurial firm as: 
Private Investmenti =I(Xi+u1i>0) 
where Private Investment is a dichotomous variable, X is a vector of project and firm 
characteristics, I is the indicator function, and u 1 ~ N(0,1). 
2.2 Small business innovation research program and database 
 
Equation 1 is estimated using project data on Phase II awards funded by NIH’s SBIR program. 
The SBIR program was created in 1982 under the U.S. Small Business Innovation Development 
Act of 1982 with the following stated objectives: to stimulate technological innovation, to use 
small business to meet Federal research and development needs, to foster and encourage 
participation by minority and disadvantaged persons in technological innovation, and to increase 
private sector commercialization of innovations derived from Federal research and development 
(R&D).6 The 1992 reauthorization of the program broadened the above objectives to emphasize 
the participation of woman-owned and -controlled firms. 
Each government agency with an extramural research budget is required to set aside a portion 
(currently equal to 2.5%) of that budget to award to small (500 or fewer employees) U.S. firms 
(at least 51% owned by U.S. citizens or lawfully admitted permanent resident aliens) in response 
to requests for proposals on defined topics. 
The structure of the SBIR program is defined by three phases: Phase I awards assist firms as they 
assess the feasibility of an idea’s scientific and commercial potential in response to the funding 
agency’s objectives; currently these are six-month awards for up to $100,000. Phase II awards 
assist firms to further their research with an expectation that the resulting technology will be 
commercialized; currently these are two−year awards for up to $750,000.7 
There are no agency awards in Phase III; it is the period of time when the funded businesses are 
to move their technology from the laboratory into the market place. The firm is expected to find 
private-sector funding (e.g., from private investors) during this period. 
Eleven agencies currently participate in the SBIR program, with the Department of Defense 
(DoD) accounting for nearly 58% of all awards, followed by Health and Human Services’ NIH 
with about 19%, and DOE with about 6% (along with the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration and the National Science Foundation with similar percentages). Currently, about 
$2 billion is allocated per year to Phase I and Phase II awards with nearly 98% accounted for by 
these five agencies. 
As part of the SBIR program’s reauthorization in 2000, the U.S. Congress charged the National 
Research Council (NRC) within the National Academies to make recommendations for 
improvements in the program. Among those evaluatory activities that the NRC undertook was an 
extensive and balanced survey in 2005 based on a population of 11,214 projects completed from 
Phase II awards during the 1992–2001 time period. 
Projects funded by NIH are the focus of this study for two important reasons, the first being 
institutional in nature and the second being statistical pragmatism. First, firms that are funded 
through the larger DoD program and are successful in completing Phase II have a captive 
audience for much of their resulting technology, namely DoD (Link and Scott 2009; Nelson 
1982). In 2005, the year of the NRC survey, nearly 40% of the technology developed by 
businesses through DoD Phase II awards was sold to that agency. And second, among the five 
agencies, NIH-funded firms are the most active in attracting private research investments, thus 
affording our empirical analysis not only a large number of project observations but sufficient 
variability in those projects that have and have not attracted such investment funds. Table 1 sets 
out the data reduction process used to create the NIH sample of 323 Phase II awards studied here 
(i = 1 − 323 in the specification of Eq. 1). 
 
Table 1 
Data reduction for the NIH sample of Phase II projects 
Data reduction Number of projects 
Population of Phase II NIH projects 2,497 
Data reduction Number of projects 
Survey population 1,680 
Random survey population 1,677 
Respondents to the survey 496 
Random sample of respondents 495 
Random sample of respondents with complete data 446 
Respondents with complete data and still in business at interview date 323 
 
2.3 Description of the variables 
 
The dependent variable, Private Investment, in Eq. 1 is a dichotomous measure that equals 1 if 
the firm received private investment funds to further its Phase II research project, and 0 if it did 
not. The dependent variable equals 1 if at least one of the following sources of private 
investment was received: U.S. VC, foreign investments, private equity, or other sources from 
private firms. 
The focal independent variable in Eq. 1 is the gender of the firm’s owner. Female equals 1 if the 
firm is majority owned by a woman, and 0 if it is majority owned by a man. There are at least 
three reasons for emphasizing the gender of the firm’s owner. As mentioned above, the 1992 
reauthorization of the SBIR program broadened its focus to emphasize the participation of 
women-owned and -controlled firms: “to provide for enhanced outreach efforts to increase the 
participation of … small businesses that are 51% owned and controlled by women.” One might 
speculate that this broadened per se focus could result in Phase I and then Phase II projects being 
funded with less commercial potential than otherwise would have been the case. If so, a signal to 
this effect, as related to this paper, could be the observation that female-owned firms have 
greater difficulty in attracting private investment funds in a competitive market than male-owned 
firms at the same stage of technology development. 
A second reason for our emphasis on the female/male ownership difference stems from the 
literature on risk taking. As reviewed by Croson and Gneezy (2009), and recently confirmed, for 
example, by von Gaudecker et al. (2011), economic experiments show that women are more risk 
averse than men in both laboratory settings and in their investment decisions.8 To the extent that 
this is true, it might be the case that female-owned firms are less likely to make the necessary 
strategy and/or investment decisions that could be necessary for the entrepreneurial firm to take 
its technology to commercialization.9 As such, gender per se might send a precautionary signal 
to private investors. 
And third, it has been suggested that there is a degree of discrimination against female 
entrepreneurs seeking financial investments (Marlow and Patton 2005). Relatedly, network 
theory suggests that individuals associate with others who are similar to themselves (Aldrich 
1989; Ruef et al. 2003), and the VC industry, as one example, is male dominated and 
homogeneous. 
We thus predict, in the context of Eq. 1, that female-owned firms will have a lower probability of 
attracting private investments than male-owned firms, ceteris paribus. However, a counter 
argument could be proffered following Gompers and Lerner (2004). If women take on less risk, 
then the outcomes of their entrepreneurial venture are less uncertain and therefore, at the margin, 
more attractive to a private investor. 
Also, held constant in Eq. 1 is the size of the Phase II award, Award. If receipt of a Phase II 
award sends a signal to the private investment market that the research has been screened at least 
twice (it cleared the Phase I and Phase II review hurdles) in terms of its commercial potential, 
then perhaps the larger the award, the greater the likelihood of commercial success, ceteris 
paribus, and the more likely that the firm will be able to attract private investment support.10 An 
interaction term, Award·Female, is also included to test for gender differences in the perceived 
potential success associated with having received a larger Phase II award. 
Not all Phase II research projects were completed at the time of the NRC survey in 2005. 
Complete Phase II equals 1 if the project was completed, and 0 otherwise. As with Female and 
Award, this variable measures uncertainty; those projects that have been completed (i.e., are less 
uncertain) are more likely to attract private investment funds, ceteris paribus, because more is 
known about the portfolio of actual outcomes from the research. 
Also mitigating a private investor’s concern about leveraging a Phase II project’s technology in 
Phase III is if the firm had previously been able to attract private investment funds for other 
projects related to the technology of the current project, Prior Private Invest. This variable equals 
1 if such prior support came from a private investor, and 0 otherwise. Ceteris paribus, firms with 
prior success in attracting private investments in support of their research should have a greater 
likelihood of attracting additional funding. 
Lastly, census-defined regional binary variables are included to control for regional differences 
in the availability of private investment funds, VC funds in particular (National Venture Capital 
Association 2011): Northeast, Midwest, and South. 
The above variables are defined in Table 2, and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. 
Table 2 
Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
Private Investment 
1 if the firm received Phase III funding of the Phase II project from a private investment 
source, 0 otherwise 
Amount Private 
Invest 
Amount of Phase III funding of the Phase II project from a private investment source 
($M) 
Female 1 if firm is solely female owned, = 0 if solely male owned 
Award Amount of the Phase II award ($M) 
Award·Female Interaction term between Award and Female 
Complete Phase II 1 if the Phase II project was completed at the time of the NRC survey; 0 otherwise 
Prior Private Invest 
1 if the firm received prior private investment research funding for technology related to 
the Phase II project 
Northeast 1 if the firm is located in the Northeast; 0 otherwise 
Midwest 1 if the firm is located in the Midwest; 0 otherwise 
South 1 if the firm is located in the South; 0 otherwise 
Response 1 if the firm responded to the NRC survey about the Phase II project; 0 otherwise 
Age Age of the Phase II award measured as (2005 – year of the award) 
Variable Definition 
Award Year XXXX 1 if the Phase II project funded in year XXXX, 0 otherwise 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics on the variables (n = 323) 
Variable Mean SD Range 
Private Investment a 0.1920 0.3944 0/1 
Amount Private Invest a ($M) 0.9295 6.8856 0–79.9 
Female 0.1672 0.3737 0/1 
Award ($M)b 0.6452 0.2320 0.0148–1.6440 
Award·Female 0.1197 0.2850 0–1.5712 
Complete Phase II 0.9040 0.2950 0/1 
Prior Private Invest 0.1858 0.3895 0/1 
Northeast 0.2972 0.4577 0/1 
Midwest 0.1641 0.3709 0/1 
South 0.2632 0.4410 0/1 
West 0.2755 0.4475 0/1 
Response (n = 1677) 0.1926 0.3945 0/1 
Age (years) 6.7864 2.5466 4–13 
Variable Mean SD Range 
Award Year 1992 0.0372 0.1894 0/1 
Award Year 1993 0.0433 0.2039 0/1 
Award Year 1994 0.0372 0.1894 0/1 
Award Year 1995 0.0526 0.2236 0/1 
Award Year 1996 0.0433 0.2039 0/1 
Award Year 1997 0.1022 0.3033 0/1 
Award Year 1998 0.1176 0.3227 0/1 
Award Year 1999 0.2012 0.4015 0/1 
Award Year 2000 0.1486 0.3563 0/1 
Award Year 2001 0.2167 0.4126 0/1 
 
a Private investment funding in the NRC database includes U.S. VC, foreign investments, private 
equity, and other sources from private firms. VC is the largest investment category. Of the 62 
firms that received private investment funds in support of their Phase II project’s technology, 11 
received VC funds. In nominal terms, the mean level of private investment was $929.5thousand; 
the mean level of VC was $389.7 thousand. Of the 62 firms that received private investments, 
the mean nominal amount of funding was $4,842.5thousand and the mean level of VC was 
$11,444.1 thousand. Equation 1 was not estimated in specific terms of VC because no female-
owned firms received such support 
b The smallest project in the sample was funded for $14,000. To account for any non-linearity in 
the impact of the award size on the propensity to receive private investment funds, lnAward was 
considered as an alternative regressor. There is no evidence of non-linearity, and the other results 
reported in Tables 4, 5, and 6 are not substantially changed when this variable was considered. 
Also, when the $14,000 award datum was dropped from the sample, the results in those tables 
were not substantially changed. These results are available from the authors on request. Finally, 
as discussed in Link and Scott (2011), it is not uncommon for a Phase II award to exceed the 
$750,000 threshold. Simply, the funding agency has the discretion to “add on” to the existing 
award when the technology being developed is especially promising to the mission of the agency 
 
A potential empirical concern in the estimation of Eq. 1 is selection bias resulting from the 
relatively low response rate.11 This possibility was considered by estimating Eq. 1 as a probit 
model with selection simultaneously with a probability of response model of the form: 
Responsei=I(Agei⋅γ1+Awardi⋅γ2+ u2i>0) 
(2) 
where u 2 ~ N(0,1) and corr(u 1, u 2) = ρ. Age measures the number of years since the Phase II 
award was received. Absent is a theoretical argument for why some firms responded to the NRC 
survey for a particular project, we hypothesize that the older the Phase II award the less 
institutional knowledge that still exists about the project and thus the less likely the firm would 
be able to respond. Also held constant in Eq. 2 is the size of the Phase II award, Award. We 
hypothesize that the larger the award the more likely the firm will have responded to the survey 
perhaps as a quid pro quo for receiving a future Phase II award. 
3 Empirical findings 
 
Table 4 presents the probit results for several specifications of Eq. 1 with controls for selection. 
The reported coefficients are average marginal effects from a maximum-likelihood probit model 
with sample selection. The standard errors are clustered by the NIH agency that funded each 
project.12 
 
Table 4 
Probit results from Eq. 1 with selection 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Female 
−0.1564** −0.4401*** −0.3397*** 
(0.0736) (0.1405) (0.1266) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Award 
– −0.0333 −0.0095 
  (0.0872) (0.0831) 
Award·Female 
– 0.3693* 0.3393* 
  (0.1970) (0.1832) 
Complete Phase II 
0.1085* 0.1126* 0.0849* 
(0.0582) (0.0582) (0.0493) 
Prior Private Invest 
– – 0.2966*** 
    (0.0404) 
Northeast 
−0.0819 −0.0829 −0.0629 
(0.0666) (0.0682) (0.0551) 
Midwest 
−0.0594 −0.0569 −0.0233 
(0.0661) (0.0639) (0.0587) 
South 
−0.1468* −0.1429* −0.1500** 
(0.0758) (0.0760) (0.0706) 
Selection model 
 Age 
−0.0822*** −0.0822*** −0.0822*** 
(0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0118) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 Award 
0.1658 0.1653 0.1654 
(0.1446) (0.1480) (0.1494) 
Constant 
−0.3657* −0.3653* −0.3652* 
(0.2007) (0.2012) (0.2003) 
Wald χ 2 
(df) 
18.09 
(5) 
51.32 
(7) 
183.12 
(8) 
Log pseudo-likelihood −950.6283 −949.9612 −925.6649 
ρ 
−0.1766 −0.1765 −0.2082 
(0.3559) (0.3632) (0.4055) 
Wald χ 2 (1) of independent equations (ρ = 0) 0.23 0.22 0.24 
Probability value of χ 2 (1) statistic 0.6294 0.6362 0.6212 
Dependent variable: Private Investment. The reported probit coefficients are average marginal 
effects. The standard errors are clustered by funding agency. There are 1,354 censored 
observations and 323 uncensored observations 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The parsimonious specification in column (1) controls only for the gender of the owner, if the 
Phase II project has been completed, and regional dummies. The results suggest that female-
owned firms are nearly 16% points less likely to obtain private investment funding (significant at 
the 0.05 level) compared to male-owned firms. The magnitude of this estimate is large; the 
descriptive statistics in Table 3 show that only 19% of firms in the sample obtained private 
investment funding after the Phase II award. This result confirms our initial prediction above, the 
Gompers/Lerner caveat aside. Also as expected, the coefficient on Complete Phase II is positive 
and significant (0.10 level). Firms that completed their projects are 11% points more likely to 
obtain private funding for Phase III, ceteris paribus. 
Award and Award·Female are in the specification in column (2). Presumably, the way in which 
private investors use the information conveyed by the amount of the award is different depending 
on the gender of the firm’s owner. The estimated marginal effect for Award is close to zero and 
not statistically significant, whereas the marginal effect of the interaction between Award and 
Female equals 0.3693, and is significant (0.10 level). The coefficient on Female is higher in 
absolute value compared to the specification in column (2); the marginal effect in this 
specification is −0.4401. We interpret these results to suggest that firms with a female owner are 
considerably less likely to be the target of private investors. Although a one standard deviation 
increase in the amount of a Phase II award (σ = $232,000) is predicted to shrink the gap by 9% 
points, the gap remains substantial. Stated differently, given two otherwise identical projects and 
firms, one with a male owner and the other one with a female owner, the latter’s project would 
have to receive $1.2 million more in Phase II funding (assuming that the true coefficient of 
Award is 0) for the two projects to have an equal probability of receiving private investment 
funds to leverage the firm in Phase III. This amount is almost as large as the difference between 
the smallest and largest Phase II awards observed in the sample (see Table 3). Controlling for the 
amount of Phase II award does not produce much change in the coefficient on the Complete 
Phase II variable: its marginal effect is 0.1126 compared to 0.1085 in column (1). 
The specification in column (3) controls for prior private investment support of research on a 
technology related to the Phase II award. The coefficient on Prior Private Invest is highly 
significant, and the estimated marginal effect suggests that firms that received prior private 
investment research funding for the technology related to their Phase II project are 30% more 
likely to receive private investment funding for their current Phase II project.13 
In column (3), the estimated gap between male- and female-owned firms shrinks slightly: the 
marginal effect is −0.3397 compared to −0.4401 in column (2).14 Also, the results in column (3) 
suggest that firms located in the South census region are less likely to receive Phase III funding. 
The estimated marginal effects are between −0.1429 and −0.1500, depending on the 
specification, and are significant at the 5 or 10% level. 
Table 4 also shows the results from the first stage selection model. As hypothesized, the age of 
the Phase II award is negatively correlated with the probability of selection. The estimated 
coefficient on Award is positive in all three specifications, but not statistically significant in any. 
The correlation between the error terms in Eqs. 1 and 2, rho, is negative, small in absolute value 
(between −0.18 and −0.21), and not significant. A test of the hypothesis that rho = 0 fails to 
reject the null with a probability value of over 0.6. Thus, we believe that selection bias is not an 
issue. 
Absent is any statistical evidence of selection bias; the specifications of Eq. 1 considered in 
Table 4 were re-estimated with year-of-funding fixed effects. Table 5 shows the results from the 
probit model in which we do not control for selection. The coefficients are almost identical to 
those reported in Table 4. The main difference is that the marginal effect of Female is slightly 
larger in absolute value, and so is the estimated marginal effect of Award·Female (−0.3745 and 
0.3805 in the full model in column (3), respectively). These coefficients imply that private 
investors use even more of the information conveyed by the size of the Phase II award when 
deciding whether to fund a female-owned firm. None of the indicator variables for year of the 
award is significant individually, but they are significant as a group. Also, the estimated 
coefficients do not suggest that there is a time trend in the data.15 
Table 5 
Probit results from Eq. 1 without selection 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Female 
−0.1573** −0.4618*** −0.3745*** 
(0.0752) (0.1431) (0.1081) 
Award 
– −0.0581 −0.0889 
  (0.1055) (0.1008) 
Award·Female 
– 0.3978** 0.3805** 
  (0.1931) (0.1575) 
Complete Phase II 
0.1021* 0.1075** 0.0750* 
(0.0559) (0.0548) (0.0446) 
Prior Private Invest 
– – 0.2994*** 
    (0.0431) 
Northeast 
−0.0869 −0.0883 −0.0619 
(0.0646) (0.0659) (0.0526) 
Midwest −0.0614 −0.0606 −0.0279 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
(0.0674) (0.0652) (0.0555) 
South 
−0.1499** −0.1463** −0.1471** 
(0.0731) (0.0729) (0.0664) 
Award Year 1993 
0.0110 0.0142 0.0413 
(0.1449) (0.1445) (0.1339) 
Award Year 1994 
−0.1810 −0.1798 −0.1229 
(0.1628) (0.1640) (0.1515) 
Award Year 1995 
−0.0388 −0.0265 0.0717 
(0.1445) (0.1542) (0.1541) 
Award Year 1996 
−0.0074 −0.0061 0.1058 
(0.0771) (0.0747) (0.0987) 
Award Year 1997 
0.0247 0.0385 0.0796 
(0.0993) (0.1004) (0.1159) 
Award Year 1998 
−0.0250 −0.0109 0.0470 
(0.1278) (0.1291) (0.1285) 
Award Year 1999 
−0.0531 −0.0421 0.0362 
(0.0890) (0.0987) (0.0939) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Award Year 2000 
0.0503 0.0607 0.1320 
(0.1254) (0.1244) (0.1400) 
Award Year 2001 
−0.0171 −0.0145 0.0147 
(0.0990) (0.0998) (0.0944) 
Wald χ 2 
(df) 
173.61 
(14) 
859.40 
(16) 
1863.99 
(17) 
Pseudo R 2 0.0602 0.0648 0.2226 
Log pseudo-likelihood −148.45295 −147.72028 −122.80163 
 
Dependent variable: Private Investment. The reported coefficients are average marginal effects 
from probit models. The standard errors are clustered by funding agency. n = 323 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
To test for the robustness of our conclusion that there are statistically significant differences in 
the supply of private investment between female- and male-owned technology-based 
entrepreneurial firms, as defined by our sample of Phase II research project firms, we considered 
the dollar amount of private funding that firms received to support their Phase II research, 
Amount Private Invest, as an alternative dependent variable. As shown in Table 3, the amount of 
private investment funding varies substantially in the sample of 323 projects: the mean of 
Amount Private Invest is $0.9295 million, with a standard deviation of 6.8856.16 This variability 
suggests that by only looking at whether or not a firm received private investment funding we 
might ignore information available in the data. 
Thus, we estimate a tobit model, in which 
 
The variables included in vector X are the same firm and project characteristics used to estimate 
Eq. 1. 
The tobit estimates in Table 6 are from the full model with all controls.17 The coefficients and 
standard errors in column (1) show the marginal effects on the latent variable y*. Column (2) 
displays the conditional expected values: the marginal effect of each independent variable on the 
observations with positive Amount Private Invest.18 Clearly, the factors affecting the amount of 
private investment capital that firms receive are similar to the correlates of the probability of 
receiving any funding. Female owners tend to receive less private investment funding, but the 
gap is narrower among firms with larger Phase II awards. Completing the Phase II project sends 
a positive signal to investors, and so does having received private investment funding in the past. 
Firms in the South Census region tend to receive less capital from private investors. 
 
Table 6 
Tobit results from Eq. 3 
Variable δ dE (y|y > 0)/dX 
Female 
−28.3763*** 
−3.8089 (10.2058) 
Award 
−5.4217 
−0.9611 (9.3338) 
Award·Female 
29.0211** 
5.1444 (14.6581) 
Complete Phase II 
7.7557*** 
1.2361 (2.6820) 
Prior Private Invest 19.2187*** 4.3361 
Variable δ dE (y|y > 0)/dX 
(3.6702) 
Northeast 
−3.7602 
−0.6494 (4.2838) 
Midwest 
−3.0903 
−0.5284 (3.8104) 
South 
−8.7869* 
−1.4543 (5.0775) 
Award Year 1993 
11.9487 
2.6022 (11.0084) 
Award Year 1994 
12.1266 
2.6568 (15.0670) 
Award Year 1995 
6.3827 
1.2565 (10.3191) 
Award Year 1996 
7.5577 
1.5218 (6.1509) 
Award Year 1997 
4.7503 
0.9021 (7.2815) 
Variable δ dE (y|y > 0)/dX 
Award Year 1998 
3.8989 
0.7296 (8.1846) 
Award Year 1999 
2.8096 
0.5134 (6.6856) 
Award Year 2000 
9.9929 
2.0219 (8.3116) 
Award Year 2001 
3.7374 
0.6886 (6.3866) 
Constant 
−26.7776*** 
  (9.1287) 
Tobin’s sigma 
16.2247 
  (3.3061) 
Pseudo R 2 0.0829   
χ 2 (17) 58.54   
Log-likelihood −323.60269   
Dependent variable: Amount Private Invest. The standard errors are clustered by funding 
agency. n = 323 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
4 Summary remarks 
 
Based on a random sample of NIH-funded Phase II research projects, our principal finding 
suggests that woman entrepreneurs are disadvantaged when it comes to attracting private 
investment funds to bridge the transition from invention to innovation. This conclusion does not 
challenge the legislated mandate to increase the participation of women-owned and -controlled 
firms in the SBIR program. Rather, it underscores that a legislated directive in itself might not be 
sufficient to overcome market perceptions about the profitability of requisite private investments 
to bring the developed technology to market. 
We also find that private investors make use of available information to attempt to solve the 
asymmetric information problem. In particular, our results suggest that private investment funds 
are more likely to flow to a Phase II research project after it has been completed, and if the firm 
conducting the Phase II research had previously been successful in soliciting private investment 
funds on related projects. 
This paper is the first systematic investigation of the flow of private investments to technology-
based entrepreneurial firms, women-owned firms in particular, and the first systematic 
investigation at the project level. However, future investigations will hopefully be able to 
overcome some of the data limitations that accompanied the NRC database upon which our 
empirical investigation is based. In particular, our analysis in this paper is on the supply of 
private investment funds, but certainly an important next step would be to quantify how the 
amount of those funds and when they were received affect the firm’s ability to leverage its 
technology toward the market, the success of the related innovations in the market, and the 
subsequent life of the entrepreneurial venture. 
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Footnotes 
1 The term Valley of Death is generally attributed to Congressman Vernon Ehlers (1998, p. 40). 
Branscomb and Auerswald (2002) refer to the Valley of Death as the transition stage from 
science-based invention to commercial innovation during which venture capital is the primary 
alternative source of investment. According to Wessner (2007, p. 7): “The difficulty of attracting 
investors to support an imperfectly understood, as yet-to-be-developed innovation is especially 
daunting. Indeed, the term ‘Valley of Death’ has come to describe this challenging transition 
when a developing technology is deemed promising, but too new to validate its commercial 
potential and thereby attract the capital necessary for its development.” 
2 According to Schumpeter (1934, p. 78), the entrepreneur is the person who innovates, who 
makes new combinations in production: “everyone is an entrepreneur only when he actually 
‘carries out new combinations,’ and loses that character as soon has he has built up his business, 
when he settles down to running it as other people run their business.” Thus, bridging the Valley 
of Death is an entrepreneurial responsibility. See Hébert and Link (2006, 2009). 
3 The Diana Project, named after the Roman goddess of the hunt and thus symbolizing women’s 
hunt for the rewards of entrepreneurial effort, was a multi-university research program to identify 
factors that support and enable high growth in women-led ventures. This project was funded by 
the Kauffman Foundation, the U.S. Small Business Administration, the National Women’s 
Business Council, and the Swedish Institute for Small Business Research (Gatewood et al. 2009). 
4 As Wessner (2009) has shown with regard to entrepreneurial firms in the United States funded 
by Small Business Innovation Research awards, the focal data in this paper, venture capital is an 
infrequently available source of alternative private investments. 
5 Gompers and Lerner (2004) also review the literature related to each of these factors. 
6 For a theoretical justification of the role of the SBIR, see Link and Scott (2010, 2011). 
7 Being considered under the current temporary reauthorization of the SBIR program (to 
November 18, 2011 under H.R. 2608) are caps on Phase I awards of 150,000and1,000,000 on 
Phase II awards. These caps are effective under a March 30, 2010 amended SBIR policy 
directive initiated by the U.S. Small Business Administration. These caps are expected to be 
made when the program is reauthorized. 
8 See also Levin et al. (1988), Johnson and Powell (1994), Barsky et al. (1997), Jianakoplos and 
Bernasek (1998), Sundén and Surette (1998), and Borghans et al. (2009). Schubert et al. (1999) 
present findings that question the prevalence of such a gender-specific risk attitude. However, 
research in the field of psychology shows that men and women are equal in terms of their innate 
creativity (Baer and Kaufman 2008). 
9 This lack of risk taking could be related to a lack of self-confidence, and Brana (2011) 
discusses the latter in the context of gender and entrepreneurial ventures. 
10 This argument suggests that one should compare the probability of a research project being 
supported by private investment between projects funded and not funded by SBIR. While a 
matched pairs analysis would be interesting, such data are not available in the NRC database, 
and may not be available at all. Although Lerner (1999) has compared a large sample of SBIR 
awardees and matching firms, finding that the SBIR recipients have higher employment growth, 
Lerner and Kegler (2000, p. 321) explain that it is difficult with the matched pairs analysis “to 
disentangle whether the superior performance of the awardees is due to the selection of better 
firms or the positive impact of the awards.” 
11 There are 1,677 projects in the full NIH random survey population, of which 495 (29.5%) 
respond to the survey and 323 (19.3%) are used to estimate Eq. 1 (see Table 1). 
12 There are 22 different agencies within the NIH that funded the 323 projects in the main 
estimation sample. The agencies that funded the most projects are the National Cancer Institute 
(53 projects) and the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute (37 projects). 
13 Since this variable conveys similar information to the Phase II award amount, it is not 
surprising that including it slightly reduces the absolute value of the coefficients on Award and 
Award·Female: to −0.0095 and 0.3393, respectively. 
14 The most likely reason is that, similar to private investment for Phase III research, pre-Phase 
II funding is also highly correlated with gender. Of the projects in the sample, 21% of male firm 
owners received private research funding prior to the Phase II award, compared to only 6% of 
female firm owners. This difference is statistically significant. 
15 We also re-estimated the model with a polynomial in Age and did not find a relationship. 
These results are available from the authors upon request. 
16 The mean and standard deviation conditional on positive investment are 4.8425 and 15.1991, 
respectively. 
17 The results from the specifications in columns (1) and (2) in Table 5 are available on request 
from the authors. 
18 These coefficients show how the dependent variable changes when we change the X variables 
when Private investment equals 1, ignoring the changes in the probability of receiving Phase III 
funding associated with changes in the independent variables. 
